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Anonymous said...

花旗负资产按揭可能高达754亿美元

2008年01月24日

　　美联储在1月22日紧急减息75个基点之后，当天的美股低开后反弹。不过花旗继续跌势，收报24.40美元，下跌0.2%。1月15日公布第四季度业绩当天，花旗在纽交所的股价就应声下挫了7.3%，收报26.94美元，从近一年来最高点的55.55美元下跌了51.5%。

　　花旗上周的业绩报告显示，相关次按的拨备达181亿美元，使亏损达98.3亿美元，这两个数字使花旗成为次按危机中受伤最重的银行之一。上周花旗业绩报告出台之后，标准普尔将花旗的信贷评级降为AA-。不过，标准普尔的大中华区资深董事曾怡景对本报记者表示，花旗的股价与评级并没有直接关系，股价所反映的是市场对于这家银行的判断。

　　雷曼兄弟的高级副总裁兼全球首席经济学家Paul Sheard对本报记者表示，次按危机波及全球多个地区，估计美国经济衰退的几率大概有40%，不过他没有评论次按危机中银行业的损失情况。

　　一位摩根士丹利不愿意公开姓名的分析师表示，"花旗财报埋伏着很多炸弹，仅负资产按揭一项可能就相当严重。"

　　负资产按揭或高达754亿美元

　　在国内消费信贷方面，花旗产生了41亿美元的损失，主要包括6.9亿美元的高等级信贷净损失和33.1亿美元的净贷款损失准备。信贷损失的增加，主要包括一次住房按揭和二次住房按揭的违约率增长，以及未保护的个人贷款、信用卡和汽车贷款等方面的损失。

　　目前花旗的一次楼按和二次楼按的信贷规模一共2144亿美元。业绩报告上的LTV指标(loan to value ratio， 指楼按对楼宇价值的比率)显示花旗按揭有很大的比例已经暴露于风险之中，楼价下跌将对银行产生很大影响。香港的银行在贷款时LTV以70%为标准，而美国这方面的标准比较高。

　　根据花旗官方发布的业绩简报(Fourth Quarter 2007 Earnings Review)，在花旗的楼按组合中，一次楼按为共有1514亿美元，其中LTV小于80%的楼按1074.94亿美元，占一次楼按的71%;LTV在80%-90%之间的136.26亿美元，占一次楼按的9%;而LTV等于或超过90%的楼按302.8亿美元，占花旗一次楼按的20%。

　　一次楼按29%的部分处于危险状态，即楼价下跌20%，这部分资产都会变成负资产按揭。高盛在1月15日发布的一份研究报告预计，美国楼价将由高峰至低点会跌20%至25%。按照这种估算，花旗持有的一次负资产按揭可能将在439.06亿美元以上。

　　花旗的报告也显示，其二次楼按共630亿美元，其中LTV小于80%的楼按315亿美元，占二次楼按的50%;LTV在80%-90%之间的100.8亿美元，占二次楼按的16%;而LTV等于或超过90%的楼按214.2亿美元，占二次楼按的34%，比例也相当高。按照高盛对于楼价未来走势的估计，花旗二次楼按变成负资产按揭的比例将超过50%，即至少有315亿美元二次楼按贷款规模超过抵押房屋的价值。

　　两项相加，一次、二次楼按可能变为负资产按揭的规模高达754亿美元。

　　如果经济陷入衰退，随着消费者无力偿还信用卡和汽车贷款，花旗和其他银行可能需要计入更多亏损，为此，花旗在第四财季计提74亿美元潜在贷款损失准备金可能远远不足。

　　1月23日，投资银行雷曼兄弟高级副总裁兼亚太区首席经济学家苏博文接受本报采访时表示，上星期美国政府推出1500亿美元的救市措施，虽然这些措施出台得比较迟，不过相信行政手段刺激经济的成效将于今年第二季度开始显现，美国第二季度的GDP可能会因为救市措施而增加1%。

　　花旗的巨额亏损主要受次贷损失和国内消费信贷两方面的影响。在次按风暴中出问题的，是把次按等资产打包而成的债务抵押债券(Collateralized debt obligation，CDO)，以及用CDO作抵押品发行的商业票据。花旗的业绩报告显示，拨备的181亿美元来自定息债券市场部门，包括143亿美元的高信用等级资产支持债券CDO，和29亿美元的借贷和结构性产品。

　　截至去年9月底，花旗有关CDO的数额是546亿美元，第四季减值181亿美元，比例达到33.2%，因此到2007年底，花旗的CDO规模降为373亿美元。不过，美国Tavakoli Structured Finance Inc的总裁Janet Tavakoli表示，花旗可能需要再减值33亿美元。Janet Tavakoli认为CDO的市场价格比较低，花旗的资产冲减并没有完全反映当前的市场价格。如果用市场价格来计算，花旗的冲减总额应达到210亿美元左右。

　　花旗的首席财务官Gary Crittenden在回应上述指责时说，花旗已经进行了"认为适当的冲减"。花旗使用了各种模型来对债券进行估价。花旗也考虑了各地住房市场之间的差异，以及参考了其他跟踪次级债的指数。

　　其实，去年底次按风暴越演越烈的时候，已经有投资者和监管部门开始调查投资银行以及对冲基金所持有资产的定价问题。

　　由于CDO交易比较少，所以缺乏可靠的市场价格资讯。"金融会计标准协会"(Financial Accounting Standard Board)要求必须以公平价格来计算出资产的"退出价格"(Exit Price)，而非"进入价格"(Enter Price)。"退出价格"是指出售资产的市场价格，而目前投行和对冲基金普遍使用其内部设计的数学公式推算的价格。

January 26, 2008 at 12:03 PM  

JingXiong said...

I'm perspiring reading those words. ha!

January 26, 2008 at 12:11 PM  

Anonymous said...

国际金融资本的势力：货币战争

自1694年英格兰银行成立以来的３００年间，几乎每一场世界重大变故背后，都能看到国际金融资本势力的身影。他们通过左右一国的经济命脉掌握国家的政治命运，通过煽动政治事件、诱发经济危机，控制着世界财富的流向与分配。可以说，一部世界金融史，就是一部谋求主宰人类财富的阴谋史。随着中国金融的全面开放，国际银行家将大举深入中国的金融腹地。昨天发生在西方的故事，今天会在中国重演吗？

January 26, 2008 at 2:32 PM  

Anonymous said...

It's rough out there

The Economist
Jan 24th 2008

Panic in the markets is scary. Among policymakers it only makes things worse

THE financial storm that blew up in America's subprime mortgage market last year has become a hurricane. The ill wind from reckless property lending blasted first the market in asset-backed securities, then banks' balance sheets and, most recently, stockmarkets. Across the globe, more than $5 trillion has disappeared from the value of public companies in the first three weeks of January. Many markets are 20% or more below their highs, the informal definition of a bear market. On January 21st share prices plunged from Brazil to Britain in the worst day of trading since September 11th 2001.
Although America's exchanges were closed that day, its policymakers' response was more than commensurate. Before Wall Street opened on January 22nd the Federal Reserve announced an unscheduled rate cut of three-quarters of a percentage point, to 3.5%, its fastest easing in a quarter of a century. A day later the New York insurance regulator and leading banks began work on a multi-billion-dollar plan to rescue the country's teetering bond insurers. As the markets pitch and yaw the pressing question is whether central bankers and regulators have acted with swift prudence, or ill-judged panic.

There is no doubt that this is a frightening moment. But the narrow economic rationale for the Fed's emergency rate-cut this week was thin. America's weak economy means monetary policy can, and should, be loosened considerably. But the central bankers' next scheduled meeting begins on January 29th. Since lower interest rates take several months to work through the economy, accelerating rate cuts by a few days will not much affect the outcome. Yes, share prices had been falling sharply across the globe, but the slide was orderly and the system had not seized up. The Fed seems to have been spooked, and wanted to stop the markets' fall.

That is a dangerous path for a central bank to tread. Its success will now be identified with short-term movements on Wall Street. Indeed, as the stockmarket shrugged off the latest rate cut, the Fed's authority already looked diminished. As if to prove the point, shares soared only when the insurance regulator appeared. Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman and guardian of America's economy, moved Wall Street less than Eric Dinallo, whom nobody had heard of, saying he would rescue some insurers nobody understood.

Rather than chasing the market's tail, the Fed ought to be asking what the markets' fall really signals. The answer is: unsurprising judgments that should not have led it to panic.

The Bernanke put-upon

For much of last year, stockmarkets ignored the bad news from the credit markets, thanks to three assumptions. First, that policymakers, led by the Fed, would avert recession in the United States. Second, that even if America stumbled, the rest of the world economy was “decoupled” and would carry on growing healthily. And third, that the credit mess would be confined to areas related to subprime mortgages.

These assumptions were always over-optimistic. America's economy has stalled as the building bust deepens and consumers cope with the triple whammy of falling house prices, tighter credit and dearer oil. The labour market is weakening at a pace that has in the past heralded recession. The rest of the world, meanwhile, is slowing. Europe's outlook has darkened. Its banks are embroiled in the credit crisis; and one of them, Société Générale, has lost €4.9 billion ($7.1 billion) in a fraud. Japan is weak; even turbo-charged China may cool.

And the credit crisis has continued to spread. Corporate lending and parts of consumer credit, such as credit cards and car loans, are wobbly. The looming downgrades—and possible bankruptcies—of the “monoline” insurers of some $2.4 trillion of bonds boded worse until Mr Dinallo moved. They would have hurt states and municipalities that are their biggest customers; and banks that had bought insurance in credit-derivative trades would also have been hit. A further round of losses at the banks could have been catastrophic. With the system at risk, no wonder stockmarkets swooned.

Heavy weather

None of this is exactly cheerful, but it is not disastrous, either. Particular problems, like the monoline insurers, should be dealt with by particular remedies, not the warm bath of monetary policy. It is early days, but one choice for Mr Dinallo would be to corral their worst risks in a “bad bank”, leaving the rest intact—and more tightly regulated.
As to decoupling, although the rest of the world remains somewhat vulnerable to America's troubles, most rich economies are in a slightly better shape than the United States, and most emerging ones are better able to withstand an American downturn than they were. Many have plenty of reserves and flexible exchange rates, making a rerun of the 1997-98 crises unlikely. Many are growing nicely on the back of rising domestic demand and regional trade links. And many have strong budget positions, leaving room for fiscal loosening to offset weakening exports.

American policymakers also have tools to cushion—if not forestall—the downturn. Lower interest rates may not stop house prices falling, nor will they prevent banks from tightening their lending standards. But monetary policy can still stimulate the economy, as lower rates boost banks' profitability, bring down firms' borrowing costs and improve indebted consumers' cash flow. Equally, fiscal policy will be a prop. Of course, President Bush promised too much when he suggested that a stimulus package would keep the economy “healthy”. But Congress is rushing the $150 billion package through, and, even if it takes a while to reach firms and consumers, it will give the economy a boost.

Taken together, the signs from the world economy are troubling. The credit binge will not unwind quickly or gently. Asset prices will fall. But central bankers and regulators have the tools to stop a downturn from becoming a slump, so long as they use them sensibly. Reacting to market panic with panicky rate cuts is likely to make things worse rather than better. The Fed should always be the calm centre of a financial storm.

January 26, 2008 at 2:39 PM  

QUALITY STOCKS UNDER 5 DOLLARS said...

The dow jones is only thirty companies no big deal anymore.

January 16, 2013 at 6:09 AM  

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